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BAYESIAN RAPID OPTIMAL ADAPTIVE DESIGN (BROAD): METHOD AND
APPLICATION DISTINGUISHING MODELS OF RISKY CHOICE
DEBAJYOTI RAY1 , DANIEL GOLOVIN2 , ANDREAS KRAUSE3 AND COLIN
CAMERER4∗
Economic surveys and experiments usually present fixed questions to respondents.
Rapid computation now allows adaptively optimized questions, based on previous re-
sponses, to maximize expected information. We describe a novel method of this type
introduced in computer science, and apply it experimentally to six theories of risky
choice. The EC2 method creates equivalence classes, each consisting of a true theory
and its noisy-response perturbations, and chooses questions with the goal of distinguish-
ing between equivalence classes by cutting edges connecting them. The edge-cutting
information measure is adaptively submodular, which enables a provable performance
bound and lazy evaluation which saves computation. The experimental data show that
most subjects, making only 30 choices, can be reliably classified as choosing according
to EV or two variants of prospect theory. We also consider whether subjects should and
could manipulate by misreporting preferences, and find little evidence of manipulation.
KEYWORDS: JEL: C520 - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection; C800 - Data
Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs: General; C910 -
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual;.
1. INTRODUCTION
Choices used in experimental and survey-based social science are typically
developed by hunches and cumulative search for informative questions that test
theories. The conventional designs that have emerged are typically a fixed set of
1Computation and Neural Systems. California Institute of Technology. email:
dray@caltech.edu
2Google, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA. email: golovin@gmail.com
3Computer Science. California Institute of Technology. email: krausea@caltech.edu
4Humanities and Social Sciences. California Institute of Technology. email:
camerer@hss.caltech.edu, ∗Corresponding Author.
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test questions .1
A popular example in estimating risk preference, introduced by ? (HL, here-
after)2 is a “choice list”, in which one makes a sequence of ten choices between
two gambles that each have the same set of possible payoffs throughout the se-
quence, but in which the distribution over payoffs varies. Specifically, each gam-
ble has two payoffs, high and low, and the probability of the high payoff is i∗0.1
for both gambles in the ith choice in the list. Using a fixed set of items permits
rapid near-replications to establish rugged stylized facts across studies.
We propose an approach, in which the sequence of choices is customized for
each subject rather than fixed. The subjects themselves tell us, through their an-
swers, the “best”(most informative) question to ask them next. We illustrate the
approach using an experiment on theories of risky choice: Viz., expected util-
ity, prospect theory, and statistical moments models (mean-variance-skewness).
Our approach is abbreviated as BROAD, for Bayesian Rapid Optimal Adaptive
Design. The BROAD method is an innovation in an old, large family of adap-
tive methods (described in the next subsection). The big contribution is an edge-
cutting measure of information value which is adaptively submodular, which
therefore provably guarantees some useful theoretical and practical properties.
The method was introduced by ?, and applied here to novel economic questions,
and includes new ideas about how to detect and control strategizing by subjects.
Earlier applications of adaptive methods were made in statistics (?), decision
theory (?), computer-assisted testing (CAT) in psychometrics (e.g., ?) and cogni-
tive psychology (e.g., ?), adaptive choice-based conjoint measurement in market-
ing (e.g., ?), “active learning” methods in computer science (e.g., ?) and machine
learning (??), and management science (??).
1Note that “test questions”, in experimental economics could include choices from budget sets
???, strategies in games, auction bids, and trading strategies. Our method could also be applied
to large-scale panel surveys in which branching methods are already used (as in, “If your answer
to (18) is “No” please skip to question (24)”).
2The HL paper had 1764 Google Scholar citations as of 8/27/2012.
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Note that some early efforts to introduce optimal adaptive design in experi-
mental economics (e.g., ?, ?, ?) did not gain traction. The time is now riper for
BROAD methods because: Computing power is better than ever; a new method
from computer science (called EC2) applied here provides theoretical guaran-
tees on efficient computability; and there are many new competing theories in
behavioral economics which need to be efficiently compared.
In our application and all the others mentioned above, the goal is to sequen-
tially select among a set of noisy, expensive observations (outcomes of experi-
ments, medical tests to run to diagnose patients, etc.) in order to determine which
hypothesis (theory, diagnosis, etc.) is most accurate. One way to formalize such
active learning problems is Bayesian experimental design (?). This approach
specifies prior beliefs over a set of hypotheses, as well as probabilistic assump-
tions about the outcomes of test choices. The goal then is to determine the correct
hypothesis while minimizing the cost of the experimentation (where cost is syn-
onymous, for present purposes, with the number of test choice questions that
are asked). Unfortunately, finding an optimal sequence of test choices is not just
computationally difficult (NP-hard) but is also difficult to approximate (?). Sev-
eral heuristic approaches have been proposed that perform well in some specific
applications, but do not have theoretical guarantees (e.g., ?); that is, there are no
proofs about how costly the heuristic sequence will be compared to the optimal
sequence.
In the case where observations are noise-free3, a simple algorithm, general-
ized binary search4(GBS), is guaranteed to be competitive with the optimal test
sequence, since the expected number of tests is a factor of O(log n) (where n
is the number of hypotheses) more than that of the optimal policy (?), which
3This case is known as the Optimal Decision Tree (ODT) problem.
4GBS selects test choices to maximize, in expectation over the test outcomes, the probability
mass of eliminated hypotheses (i.e., those with zero posterior probability, computed with respect
to the observed test outcomes). The method is myopic (or “greedy” in computer science terms)
because it only searches ahead for one test at a time.
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matches lower bounds up to constant factors5 (?).
Unfortunately, when responses are likely to be imperfect or noisy, as in eco-
nomics experiments, the theoretical basis and performance of heuristic methods
is not well understood. There are no efficient algorithms that provably achieve
minimal cost, except in very restricted settings (?). 6
In this paper, we introduce and address a general formulation of Bayesian ac-
tive learning with noisy observations that we call the Equivalence Class Determi-
nation problem. We show that, perhaps surprisingly, generalized binary search,
and some other popular algorithms, perform poorly in this setting (i.e., in simula-
tions where the true hypothesis is known, the algorithms do not always discover
the true hypothesis quickly and reliably).
However, we show that a myopic (greedy) active learning algorithm using the
Equivalence Class Edge Cutting (EC2) objective function, can be proved to have
an expected cost that is a multiple of the optimal test sequence cost. The key in-
sight is that the EC2 objective function for measuring information value satisfies
adaptive submodularity (?). Adaptive submodularity is a natural diminishing re-
turns property that generalizes the classical notion of submodularity to adaptive
policies, and leads to a provable performance guarantee as well as a shortcut in
evaluating test choices (called “lazy evaluation”).
Here are some possible advantages of BROAD approaches:
◦ The posterior distribution of all theory and parameter probabilities is quickly
5In other words, unless P = NP, no efficient algorithm can be guaranteed to find a policy whose
expected number of tests is less than C log(n) times that of the optimal policy, for some absolute
constant C (see ?).
6While there are some recent positive results in understanding the label complexity (bounds
on the sample size required) of noisy active learning (??), the results depend on the assumption
that the same query can be made multiple times with independent noise. This is not appropriate
in our setting; if a test subject makes a mistake in evaluating a pair of gambles, presenting the
exact same choice later on is likely to elicit the same mistake, which induces correlation in the
noise across tests.
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recomputed for each subject after each trial (because it is a necessary step in
finding the optimal next question). As a result, when the experiment is over,
much of the data analysis is already done.
◦ Because of that instant probability updating, BROAD creates a statistical
parametric group portrait after each trial. The portraits show who seems most
impatient, most averse to risk, most reciprocal, etc. These data could then be used
to instantly form groups of different types of people to see how those differences
affect group or market behavior.
◦ Since BROAD techniques economize on information gained per minute,
they are especially useful for subject pools who have scarce time or become
bored or habituated quickly. Such groups include highly-trained professionals,
internet subjects who can quit, human groups such as lesion patients or children,
and animals that typically make long sequences of lab choices.7
◦ The fact that the BROAD procedure generates sequences of test questions
that are provably near-optimal can sharpen discourse about what different exper-
imental designs are good and bad for. Novel BROAD designs which are uncon-
ventional should gain credibility if they have desirable informational properties.
BROAD methods can also be used to judge the quality of older conventional
designs8.
◦ At each trial it is easy to compute how much extra parameter precision (or
model selection accuracy) is expected from asking one more question. This fea-
ture permits a cost-benefit method for optimally stopping the experiment (e.g.,
?), if information benefit and cost can be compared.
In economic choice applications, there is one possible imperfection in BROAD
methods: In theory, subjects might prefer to strategically manipulate their early
7A sensible argument is that ethical treatment of subjects requires using as little of their time
as possible to learn the most ?; BROAD fits that bill.
8For example, retrospective analysis of influential psychology experiments on memory reten-
tion indicates that some early designs were remarkably near-optimal but others were not (?)
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responses in order to get “better” (more economically valuable) future test ques-
tions. We pay special attention to the problem of manipulation, and discuss tests
to detect it and methods to minimize it, within our experimental procedure. This
is an important contribution of this paper, since strategic manipulation is not dis-
cussed in any detail in the most common applications (e.g. in CAT psychometric
testing), and is a problem economists are well-equipped to address.
1.1. A brief history of related adaptive methods
The idea of optimizing an experimental design to measure parameters or test
theories originated with Charles S. Peirce (?), but did not have immediate influ-
ence. Dynamic design ideas began with Wald’s influential sequential probability
ratio test (?). Later contributions were made by ?, ?, and reviewed by ? and ?. D-
optimal designs are optimal for estimating parameter values for a single theory.
T-optimal designs optimally discriminate different theories and are more com-
putationally challenging (cf. “landscaping”, by ?). Many of the principles origi-
nally developed under D- and T-optimality now permeate standard experimental
design practice.
The idea of adaptively customizing test choices goes back 100 years to ?. It
was pushed forward decades later by the US Army (?), and in psychometrics
(???) in the 1960s and 70s. The most common method is computerized adap-
tive testing (CAT) for psychometric, intelligence (e.g., GRE, ASVAB military),
health (PROMIS: ?), and psychometric measurement (see ??). CAT chooses
maximally-informative items on a psychometric test, based on a subject’s pre-
vious responses, using item response theory (IRT). There are now many applica-
tions in personnel selection and professional testing9.
9E.g., ASVAB army; GRE and TOEFL; Microsoft Certification; see more examples at a clear-
inghouse at http://www.psych.umn.edu/psylabs/catcentral. Note that there are usually practical
constraints imposed on large-scale CAT testing. These include balancing test content and test
types and avoiding “overexposure” of highly diagnostic questions which can leak out across
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Besides their statistical advantage, there is also some evidence that adaptive
methods improve test-taking motivation (?), reduce boredom (?, p. 3) and reduce
differences across ethnic groups (??).
Adaptive methods have also been used in neurophysiology (?), psychophysics
(??), and medicine (?). In marketing, adaptive choice-based “conjoint measure-
ment” (ACBC) is used to discover which feature configurations of products con-
sumers like most (e.g., Sawtooth software (?). ? found modest success for ACBC
in predicting actual product shares. A newer constraint satisfaction method called
“poly-Q” takes a different approach, finding constrained feature weights which
can explain previous choices (??). Note that improved methods will undoubtedly
improve the ability to predict real behavior from responses which are hypothet-
ical (often necessarily so). For example, ?, ?, and ? describe incentive-aligned
conjoint procedures. These methods use hypothetical data from conjoint mea-
surements or product ranks combined with random selection of a single real
product for purchase (based on WTP or rank inferred from conjoint or ranks), to
boost incentive-compatibility of the conjoint responses. In cognitive psychology,
adaptive methods have been championed by ?, ?, ?, ??. Two applications closely
related to ours are ??.
As far as we can tell from publicly available information,10 the methods above
all use variants of information gain as a criterion for choosing tests (except for
poly-Q). None thoroughly consider the problem of strategic manipulation.
2. MODELS
In this section we describe six models of subjective valuation of risky choices;
these models will later be tested experimentally using the EC2 method. The
models are presented first in order to ground discussion of the EC2 method in a
test-takers over time and undermine their future diagnostic value
10Details of how the Educational Testing Service uses CAT, and exactly how Sawtooth com-
mercial ACBS software works, for example, are hard to come by.
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concrete application. Note thatEC2 can be applied to many different comparison
of social science theories (e.g., time preference, social preference, etc.).
The six models are widely used in different areas of social sciences and in
biology. The models are: Expected Utility with Constant Relative Risk Aversion,
Expected Value, Prospect Theory, Cumulative Prospect Theory, Weighted Mo-
ments, and Weighted Standardized Moments.
Choices are risky lotteries with probabilistic outcomes (a.k.a. prospects). The
distribution of the payoffs in lottery L is a random variable with a range of pay-
offs L ≡ {`1, . . . , `k}. Lottery L is a distribution of objectively known probabil-
ities pi over payoffs, pi ≡ P [L = `i] (with
∑k
i pi = 1). For present purposes, a
payoff is an amount of money gained or lost. However, in general the lotteries
can have any payoffs which are subjectively valued by numerical utilities, or by
other quantities (e.g., biological fitness).
In expected utility (EU) theory, a lottery is valued by the probability-weighted
sum of its possible subjective payoff utilities,
∑k
i piU(`i) (?,?, ?).
Many different utility functions U(`i) have been applied and tested. We con-
sider two popular functions U(`i) The first is:
Constant-Relative-Risk-Aversion (CRRA)
UCRRA(L) =

∑
i pi(w + `i)
1−θ/(1− θ) if θ 6= 1∑
i pi log(w + `i) if θ = 1
Wealth w is non-negative, and in subsequent experiments we set wealth to the
subject’s initial endowment11.
The CRRA model is used most widely for modeling risky choices (?), in eco-
nomics (?, ?), psychology (?), and health (?).
The restriction of CRRA to θ = 0 gives Expected Value (EV)
(2.1) UEV (L) = E [L]
11Wealth, w can be set somewhat arbitrarily by assuming a level of wealth for the population.
In our framework, wealth can be treated as a parameter that can vary across subjects.
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Under EV decision-makers are neutral toward risk– they care only about the
expectation of payoff. This is an unlikely general description (especially for large
payoffs) but it is a useful benchmark.
Prospect theory (PT) is a descriptive model of risky choice proposed as a more
psychophysically-realistic alternative to EU (?). The key difference is that values
are thought to depend on gains and losses relative to a reference point (much as
sensory evaluations are generally sensitive to short-term contrast effects with
previous stimuli and experiences). Reference-dependence is important because
of two other properties assumed in prospect theory: First, diminishing marginal
sensitivity is assumed to hold both as gains increase in magnitude (from a zero-
gain point of reference) and as losses increase in magnitude (i.e., become more
negative). This assumption implies concavity of gain utility and convexity of
loss disutility (contrary to the typical EU analysis in economics, which assumes
payoffs are integrated wealth positions). Second, losses are assumed to loom
larger than gains, so that v(`i) < −v(−`i) for `i > 0.
Besides reference-dependence, PT differs from simple EU by assuming that
objective probabilities are transformed into a nonlinear subjective decision weight-
ing functions. These decision weights pi(pi) are then used to weight reference-
adjusted payoffs.
Evidence for empirical accuracy of prospect theory has come from many
methods and domains12. Nonetheless there is ongoing debate about the accuracy
of prospect theory and its important features. Most prominently, there is no clear
consensus on how reference points are established and change over time.13 As in
12See: Lab experiments (e.g., ?, ?); field surveys with large representative samples (?); pricing
of stocks (?), and options (?, ?, ?); game shows (Post et al); and neuroscience (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
13A recent suggestion is that rational expectations held in the recent past about future choices
and outcomes establish a reference point (?). Another important influence seems to be a sense
of endowment induced, among other cues, by physical proximity (e.g., ?, ?). Note that in fu-
ture designs where alternative theories of reference points make different predictions, BROAD
procedures could be used to choose highly diagnostic experimental tests.
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many other experiments, we assume a reference outcome at 0. That is, positive
outcomes are gains and negative outcomes are losses in all choices, relative to a
benchmark of a subject’s wealth at the beginning of the experiment.
A CRRA power function is used for the value function v and losses are weighed
by a factor λ (typically greater than one). The prospect value of a lottery is thus
given by:
Prospect Theory
UPT (L) =
∑
i
v(`i)pi(pi) where v(`i) =
 `
ρ
i if `i ≥ 0
−λ(−`i)ρ if `i < 0
Several decision weight functions pi(pi) have been proposed (see ?, ?). In or-
der to limit the parametric features being compared across models, we consider
only the one-parameter decision weight function axiomatically derived in ?,
which is pi(pi) = (e−(log(1/pi))
α
). The parameter α expresses the degree of in-
flection: α = 1 is linear weighting (as in EU); α < 1 expresses the inflection
hypothesized in prospect theory (?), overweighting probabilities below p = 1/e
and underweighting higher probabilities. The parameters ΘPT = {ρ, λ, α} there-
fore represent utility nonlinearity, loss aversion and decision weight inflection,
respectively.
In the PT model just described, decision weights of all probabilities do not
generally add up to one. It is well-known that this property can generate pre-
dicted violations of first-order stochastic dominance. In ? the original PT is
extended by using rank-dependent weights (following ?), in a form called Cu-
mulative Prospect Theory (CPT). In CPT, a payoff is weighted by the difference
between its transformed decumulative probability and the decumulative proba-
bility of the payoff ranked just below it in magnitude. Consider a gamble with
two positive gain payoffs `1 > `2, with objective probabilities p1 and p2 and a
zero payoff. Then the ranked payoffs are weighted pi(p1), pi(p2 +p1)−pi(p1) and
1− pi(p2 + p1).
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More generally, rank payoffs from 1 (best) to n (worst) by `1 ≥ · · · ≥ `k ≥
0 ≥ `k + 1 ≥ · · · ≥ `n. The first k payoffs are gains and payoffs ranked k + 1 to
n are losses. Denote decision weight in the gain and loss domains by w+(p) and
w−. Then the weights are
for i ≤ k : pi+i = w+(pi + · · ·+ p1)− w+(pi−1 + · · ·+ p1)
for j > k : pi−j = w
−(pj + · · ·+ pn)− w−(pj+1 + · · ·+ pn)
Then the prospect value depends on ranks and the rank dependence of decision
weights, as follows: Cumulative Prospect Theory
(2.2) UCPT (L) =
k∑
i=1
pi+i v(`i) +
n∑
j=k+1
pi−j v(`j)
Besides EU variants, PT and CPT, another class of models assumes that risky
choices are valued by computing and combining their statistical moments– their
mean, variance, and skewness (and possibly higher moments too). Moments-
based models have been most widely used in financial economics (??) and biol-
ogy14.
Including skewness creates decreasing absolute risk-aversion in intermediate
intervals and also allows for risk preference (?). It also appears to easily accom-
modate the fact that people across the world like high-skewness lottery tickets
(with negative mean return; e.g. ?), and lottery-like returns appear to be valued
in stocks and options (?; ?). In behavioural ecology, foraging animals have been
shown to respond to mean and variance of food outcomes15.
14Criticisms of the mean-variance approach emerged early in its evolution. EU valuations can
be approximated by weighting mean and variance, using a Taylor expansion argument. However,
mean-variance is strictly compatible with EU-based choice only if payoff utility is quadratic or
if risky choice payoffs are normally distributed (?, ?). Quadratic utility can lead to stochastic
dominance valuations, and implies that absolute risk-aversion is increasing, which is unlikely
(? and ?). However, analyses suggest the conclusions from mean-variance models are robust to
deviations from quadratic utility and normality (??).
15? reviews the empirical and theoretical literature that investigate animals’ response to vari-
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Two models defined next capture the most common types of moments-based
models. Mean-Variance-Skewness (MVS)
(2.3) UMV S(L) = wµµ− wσ2σ2 + wνν
where ΘMV S = {wµ, wσ2 , wν} are the weights for the mean, variance and skew-
ness of the lottery respectively, with wµ, wσ2 , wν ≥ 0.
Since variance and skewness become much larger when payoffs are scaled
up, it is also reasonable to include a standardized version of weighted moments
that scales with payoff increases more gracefully: Standardized Mean-Variance-
Skewness (SMVS)
(2.4) USMV S(L) = wµµ− wσσ + wν˜ ν˜
where ΘSMV S = {wµ, wσ, wν˜} are the weights for the mean, standard deviation
and standardized skewness of the lottery respectively, where wµ, wσ, wν˜ ≥ 0.
We therefore have six different models to compare. Many previous experi-
ments tried to design choices which are most different (i.e., most diagnostic) in
these different models. For example, EU and MVS approaches predict either a
general aversion to payoff variance, or a preference. PT and CPT allow an aver-
sion to variance over gains and a preference for variance over losses. It is there-
fore easy to design choices with gains and losses in which the theories make
different predictions (see ?).
A subtler difference arises between PT/CPT, and MVS/SMVS approaches.
PT and CPT predict a high subjective value for risks with low-probability high-
payoff gains (due to nonlinear decision weights pi(p) on the extreme gains).
MVS and SMVS also predict high subjective value for such risks because their
skewness is positive. Distinguishing the two approaches therefore requires a deft
ability in rate of gain. ? argue that although humans choosing monetary risks and foraging
animals are averse to variance, the coefficient of variation (or relative standard deviation) is a
more accurate measure of risk sensitivity.
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touch, finding mixtures of high-payoff amount and high-payoff (weighted) prob-
ability such that pure skewness preference and high-payoff overweighting can be
distinguished.
3. DYNAMIC OPTIMAL DESIGNS
We begin with intuition about EC2, then describe the method formally. It has
three powerful properties which other information criteria do not have:
◦Most methods are sensitive to noise.16 The empirical applications which we
have an mind all feature responses with some degree of stochastic noise (i.e.,
people choosing according to decision rule will not make the same choice every
single time from a fixed choice set). Many of the good properties of previous
adaptive methods rely on deterministic, no-noise processes (so that hypotheses
are immediately eliminated by a single unpredicted “mistake”). Our methodEC2
reduces the noisy case to a formally tractable noiseless case, so good perfor-
mance properties carry over while noise is allowed.
◦ It can be proved that there is a worst-case cost bound for greedy EC2 which
depends on ln(1/pmin) (where pmin is the prior probability of the least-likely
theory). What does that imply? In a medical setting, for example, there could be
a dangerous disease which is extremely rare (pmin is low) but highly contagious;
and figuring out for sure whether a patient has the disease is necessary for pro-
tecting public health. This kind of diagnosis will take many tests in the worst
case. However, in the empirical social science settings we are considering, the
lowest pmin is rarely very low because it is usually adequate to consider only a
modest number of possible theories and parameters (pmin might be on the order
of 10−3, for example, so that the worst-case cost multiplier is 6.9).
◦ Since our EC2 information criteria is adaptively submodular, the marginal
information value of a test can only go down after other tests have been done.
16Appendix B illustrates an example where information gain and value of information (VoI)
perform badly.
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This permits “lazy evaluation” which reduces runtime (??).
To illustrate, suppose there are 30,000 possible tests. The procedure begins by
computing the value of all 30,000 tests. The highest-value test is conducted on
trial 1, the result is recorded, and all model probabilities are updated. On trial 2,
if a candidate new test has a computed value V, then all the tests with a value
lower than V in the initial pre-trial 1 evaluation can be safely ignored (since
those values may change after the trial 1 results, but can never become larger
than V). This insight can be exploited, by considering tests in order of maximum
previously computed values (Refer to Appendix for details).
Next we will provide some background on general methods with no noise,
which sets the stage for EC2. The notation is borrowed from computer science
(see ?) and is designed to apply to a very wide range of domains (e.g., sensor
management, medical testing, etc.). A simple visual illustration is given below
(Figure 2) for the case of hypotheses about risky choice.
3.1. Bayesian Active Learning in the Noiseless Case
In the Bayesian active learning problem, we would like to distinguish among
a given set of hypothesesH = {h1, . . . , hn} by performing tests from a set T =
{1, . . . , N} of possible tests. Running test t incurs a cost of c(t) and produces an
outcome from a finite set of outcomes X = {1, 2, . . . , `}.
In our setting, H would be the parameter values of a models, and T , the set
of all possible choice pairs. X is the choice observed (X = {0, 1} for a choice
between two lotteries).
We let H denote the random variable which equals the true hypothesis, and
model the outcome of each test t by a random variable Xt taking values in
X . We denote the observed outcome of test t by xt. We further suppose we
have a prior distribution P modeling our assumptions on the joint probability
P (H,X1, . . . , XN) over the hypotheses and test outcomes.
In the noiseless case, we assume that the outcome of each test is deterministic
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given the true hypothesis, i.e., for each h ∈ H, P (X1, . . . , XN | H = h) is 0
or 1. Thus, each hypothesis h is associated with a particular vector of positive
test outcomes. We assume that no two hypotheses lead to the same outcomes for
all tests.17 Therefore, if we perform all tests, we can uniquely determine the true
hypothesis.
However in most applications we will wish to avoid performing every possible
test, as this is prohibitively expensive. Our goal is to find an adaptive policy for
running tests that allows us to determine the value of H with certainty while
minimizing the cost of the tests performed. Formally, a policy pi (also called a
conditional plan) is a partial mapping pi from partial observation vectors xA to
tests, specifying which test to run next (or whether we should stop testing) for any
observation vector xA. Hereby, xA ∈ XA is a vector of outcomes indexed by a
set of testsA ⊆ T that we have performed so far 18 (e.g., the set of binary choices
between risky gamble pairs, or outcomes of a set of medical tests). After having
made observations xA, we can rule out inconsistent hypotheses. We denote the
set of hypotheses consistent with an observation vector, or event Λ, by V(Λ) ≡
{h ∈ H : P (h | Λ) > 0}. (V(Λ) is often called the version space associated with
Λ.)
We call a policy feasible if it is guaranteed to uniquely determine the cor-
rect hypothesis. That is, upon termination with observation xA, it must hold that
|V(xA)| = 1. We can define the expected cost of a policy pi by
c(pi) ≡
∑
h
P (h)c(T (pi, h))
where T (pi, h) ⊆ T is the set of tests run by policy pi in case H = h.
Our goal is to find a feasible policy pi∗ of minimum expected cost, i.e.,
(3.1) pi∗ = arg min {c(pi) : pi is feasible}
17That is, we implicitly assume that at least one test can be done that distinguishes any two
hypotheses.
18Formally we also require that (xt)t∈B ∈ dom(pi) and A ⊆ B, implies (xt)t∈A ∈ dom(pi)
(c.f., ?).
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A policy pi can be naturally represented as a decision tree T pi, and thus prob-
lem (3.1) is often called the Optimal Decision Tree (ODT) problem.
Unfortunately, obtaining an approximate policy pi for which c(pi) ≤ c(pi∗) ·
o(log(n)) is NP-hard ( ?). Hence, various heuristics are employed to solve the
Optimal Decision Tree problem and its variants. Two of the most popular heuris-
tics are to select tests by greedily maximizing the information gain (IG) con-
ditioned on previous test outcomes, and generalized binary search (GBS). (A
search is called “greedy” if it only considers the immediate effect of tests on
some fixed measure of progress).
Both of the IG and GBS heuristics are greedy and after having made observa-
tions xA will select
t∗ = arg max
t∈T
∆Alg (t |xA) /c(t),
where Alg ∈ {IG,GBS}.
Here, ∆IG (t |xA) ≡ H (XT | xA)−Ext∼Xt|xA [H (XT |xA, xt)] is the marginal
information gain measured with respect to the Shannon entropyH (X) ≡ Ex[− log2 P (x)],
and ∆GBS (t |xA) ≡ P (V(xA)) −
∑
x∈X P (Xt = x | xA)P (V(xA, Xt = x)) is
the expected reduction in version space probability mass. Thus, both heuristics
greedily chooses the test that maximizes the benefit-cost ratio, measured with
respect to their particular (informational) benefit functions. The heuristics stop
after running a set of tests A such that |V(xA)| = 1, i.e., once the true hypoth-
esis has been uniquely determined. It turns out that for the (noiseless) Optimal
Decision Tree problem, the IG and GBS heuristics are equivalent ( ?).
Interestingly, despite its greedy property GBS has been shown ( ?, ?, ?, ?)
to obtain near-optimal expected cost: the strongest known bound is c(piGBS) ≤
c(pi∗) (ln(1/pmin) + 1) where pmin ≡ minh∈H P (h).
Let xS(h) be the unique vector xS ∈ X S such that P (xS | h) = 1. The result
above is proved by exploiting the fact that fGBS(S, h) ≡ 1−P (V(xS(h)))+P (h)
ectaart.cls ver. 2006/04/11 file: Econ_EC2.tex date: October 14, 2013
17
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 11
12 12
13 13
14 14
15 15
16 16
17 17
18 18
19 19
20 20
21 21
22 22
23 23
24 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
29 29
is adaptive submodular19 and strongly adaptively monotone, ?. These two prop-
erties will turn out to be crucial for proving theoretical guarantees of approxima-
tion bounds for EC2 later.
Call xA a subvector of xB if A ⊆ B and P (xB | xA) > 0. In this case we
write xA ≺ xB. A function f : 2T × H is called adaptive submodular w.r.t. a
distribution P , if for any xA ≺ xB and any test t it holds that
∆ (t |xA) ≥ ∆ (t |xB), where
∆ (t |xA) ≡ EH [f(A ∪ {t} , H)− f(A, H) | xA] .
Thus, f is adaptive submodular if the expected marginal benefits ∆ (t |xA) of
adding a new test t can only decrease as we gather more observations. f is called
strongly adaptively monotone w.r.t. P if, informally, “more observations never
hurt” with respect to the expected reward. Formally, for all A, all t /∈ A, and all
x ∈ X we require
EH [f(A, H) | xA] ≤ EH [f(A ∪ {t} , H) | xA, Xt = x] .
The performance guarantee for IG and GBS follows from the following gen-
eral result about the greedy algorithm for adaptive submodular functions (applied
with Q = 1 and η = pmin):
THEOREM 1 (Theorem 10 of ? with α = 1) Suppose f : 2T × H → R≥0 is
adaptive submodular and strongly adaptively monotone with respect to P and
there exists Q such that f(T , h) = Q for all h. Let η be any value such that
f(S, h) > Q− η implies f(S, h) = Q for all sets S and hypotheses h.
Then for self–certifying20 instances the adaptive greedy policy pi satisfies
c(pi) ≤ c(pi∗)
(
ln
(
Q
η
)
+ 1
)
.
19Submodularity has proved useful in many other economic contexts, e.g. ? and ?
20The technical requirement that instances be self-certifying means that the policy will have
proof that it has obtained the maximum possible objective value, Q, immediately upon doing so.
It is not difficult to show that this is the case with the instances we consider in this paper. See ?
for more detail.
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In the following sections, we will use the concept of adaptive submodularity
to provide the first approximation guarantees of test cost for Bayesian active
learning with noisy observations.
3.2. The Equivalence Class Determination Problem
There are many ways to include and estimate noise in choice. The most pop-
ular method in social science is to estimate some functional specification for the
noise term, and estimate the amount of noise as a parameter(s) in the general
model of choice21. For adaptive design this approach has been pursued by Wang,
Filiba and Camerer (2011). This can be problematic for two reasons:
First, with finite test vectors, it will generally be impossible to guarantee
feasibility– i.e., the property that a test method will certainly locate the true
hypothesis eventually– which undermines approximation guarantees. Put differ-
ently, the version space will not shrink rapidly because noise means that it is
difficult to conclusively eliminate hypotheses.
Second, honing in on likely models both accurately and precisely requires si-
multaneously identifying the noise parameter and other parameters whose iden-
tification depends on noise. The results in Wang et al. (2011) are somewhat pes-
simistic in this regard (i.e., precision in identifying the amount of noise does not
increase much over dozens of experimental trials.)
We therefore pursue a different approach. The trick is to model noise by as-
suming that there is random switching of “true” deterministic responses. To gain
intuition, consider a simple model where tests have binary outcomes, and we
know that the outcome of exactly one test, chosen uniformly at random unbe-
knownst to us, is flipped. If any pair of hypotheses h 6= h′ differs by the outcome
of at least three tests, we can still uniquely determine the correct hypothesis after
running all tests. In this case we can reduce the noisy active learning problem to
the noiseless setting by creating N “noise-injected” copies for each hypothesis.
21See ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?
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Each noisy copy is obtained by flipping the outcome of one of the N tests. The
modified prior P ′ would then assign mass P ′(h′) = P (h)/N to each noisy copy
h′ of h. The conditional distribution P ′(XT | h′) is still deterministic (since flip-
ping the outcome of one of the tests changes it from 0 to 1 or vice versa). Thus,
each deterministic hypothesis hi in the original problem is now associated with a
setHi of deterministic hypotheses in the modified problem. However, instead of
selecting tests to determine exactly which noisy copy has been realized, we only
care which set of Hi (all generated by flipping elements of hi) is realized. That
is, we will not necessarily be able to locate the correct noisy copy, but we can
locate the family Hi of noisy copies, which all spring from a single hypothesis
hi.
In the Equivalence Class Determination problem22, a set of hypotheses H
is partitioned into a set of m equivalence classes {H1, . . . ,Hm} so that H =⊎m
i=1Hi. The goal is to determine which classHi the true hypothesis lies in.
Formally, upon termination with observations xA we require that V(xA) ⊆ Hi
for some i. As with the ODT problem, the goal is to minimize the expected cost
of the tests, where the expectation is taken over the true hypothesis sampled from
P . In §3.3, we will show how the ECD problem arises naturally from Bayesian
experimental design problems in probabilistic models.
Given the fact that GBS performs near-optimally on the Optimal Decision
Tree problem, a natural approach to solving ECD would be to run GBS until
the termination condition is met. Unfortunately, and perhaps surprisingly, GBS
can perform very poorly on the ECD problem. Consider an instance with a uni-
form prior over n hypotheses, h1, . . . , hn, and two equivalence classes H1 ≡
{hi : 1 ≤ i < n} and H2 ≡ {hn}. There are tests T = {1, . . . , n} such that
hi(t) = 1[i = t], all of unit cost. Hereby, 1[Λ] is the indicator variable for event
22 ? simultaneously studied ECD, and, like us, used it to model active learning with noise ( ?).
They developed an extension of GBS for ECD. We defer a detailed comparison of our approaches
to future work.
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Λ. In this case, the optimal policy only needs to select test n. However GBS may
select tests 1, 2, . . . , n in order until running test t, where H = ht is the true
hypothesis. Given our uniform prior, it takes n/2 tests in expectation until this
happens, so that GBS costs, in expectation, n/2 times the optimal expected cost
in this instance.
The poor performance of GBS in this instance may be attributed to its lack
of consideration for the equivalence classes. Another natural heuristic would be
to run the greedy IG policy, only with the entropy measured with respect to the
probability distribution on equivalence classes rather than hypotheses. Call this
policy piIG. It is clearly aware of the equivalence classes, as it adaptively and
myopically selects tests to reduce the uncertainty of the realized class, measured
w.r.t. the Shannon entropy. However, we can show there are instances in which
it costs Ω(n/ log(n)) times the optimal cost, even under a uniform prior (see
Appendix B for an example).
The EC2 selection criterion.
The reason why GBS fails is because reducing the version space mass does
not necessarily facilitate differentiation among the classes Hi. The reason why
IG fails is that there are complementarities among tests; a set of tests can be far
better than the sum of its parts (so greedy test choice can fail badly because it
only considers one test at a time).
Thus, we would like to optimize an objective function that encourages dif-
ferentiation among classes, but lacks complementarities. We adopt an elegant
idea from ?, and define weighted edges between hypotheses that we would like
distinguish between. However, instead of introducing edges between arbitrary
pairs of hypotheses (as done in ?), we only introduce edges between hypothe-
ses in different classes23. Tests will allow us to cut edges inconsistent with their
23We do not care to distinguish noisy copies within an equivalence class, so there is no need
to create edges between these copies.
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outcomes, and we aim to eliminate all inconsistent edges while minimizing the
expected cost incurred. We now formalize this intuition.
Specifically, we define a set of edges E = ∪1≤i<j≤m {{h, h′} : h ∈ Hi, h′ ∈ Hj},
consisting of all (unordered) pairs of hypotheses belonging to distinct classes.
These are the edges that must be cut, by which we mean for any edge {h, h′} ∈ E ,
at least one hypothesis in {h, h′} must be ruled out (i.e., eliminated from the
version space). Hence, a test t run under true hypothesis h is said to cut edges
Et (h) ≡ {{h′, h′′} : h′(t) 6= h(t) or h′′(t) 6= h(t)}. See Fig. 1 for an illustration.
We define a weight function w : E → R≥0 by w({h, h′}) ≡ P (h) · P (h′). We
extend the weight function to an additive (modular) function on sets of edges in
the natural manner, i.e., w(E ′) ≡ ∑e∈E ′ w(e). The objective fEC that we will
greedily maximize is then defined as the weight of the edges cut (EC):
(3.2) fEC(A, h) ≡ w
(⋃
t∈A
Et (h)
)
The key insight that allows us to prove approximation guarantees for fEC
is that fEC shares the same beneficial properties that make fGBS amenable to
efficient greedy optimization.
PROPOSITION 2 The objective fEC is strongly adaptively monotone and adap-
tively submodular.
Based on the objective fEC , we can calculate the marginal benefits for test t
upon observations xA as
∆EC (t |xA) ≡ EH [fEC(A ∪ {t} , H)− fEC(A, H) | xA] .
We call the adaptive policy piEC that, after observing xA, greedily selects test
t∗ ∈ arg maxt ∆EC (t |xA) /c(t), the EC2 algorithm (for equivalence class edge
cutting).
Note that these instances are self–certifying, because we obtain maximum ob-
jective value if and only if the version space lies within an equivalence class, and
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the policy can certify this condition when it holds. So we can apply Theorem 1
to show EC2 obtains a ln(Q/η) + 1 approximation to Equivalence Class Deter-
mination. Hereby, Q = w(E) = 1 −∑i(P (h ∈ Hi))2 ≤ 1 is the total weight
of all edges that need to be cut, and η = mine∈E w(e) ≥ p2min is a bound on the
minimum weight among all edges. We have the following result:
THEOREM 3 Suppose P (h) is rational for all h ∈ H. For the adaptive greedy
policy piEC implemented by EC2 it holds that
c(piEC) ≤ (2 ln(1/pmin) + 1)c(pi∗),
where pmin ≡ minh∈H P (h) is the minimum prior probability of any hypothesis,
and pi∗ is the optimal policy for the Equivalence Class Determination problem.
3.3. Noisy Observations
We now address the case of noisy observations, using ideas from §3.2. With
noisy observations, the conditional distribution P (X1, . . . , XN | h) is no longer
deterministic. We model the noise using an additional random variable Θ. The
vector of test outcomes xT is assumed to be an arbitrary, deterministic function
xT : H × supp(Θ) → XN ; hence XT | h is distributed as xT (h,Θh) where
Θh is distributed as P (θ | h). For example, there might be up to s = | supp(Θ)|
ways any particular disease could manifest itself, with different patients with the
same disease suffering from different symptoms.
In cases where it is always possible to identify the true hypothesis, i.e., xT (h, θ) 6=
xT (h′, θ′) for all h 6= h′ and all θ, θ′ ∈ supp(Θ), we can reduce the problem to
Equivalence Class Determination with hypotheses {xT (h, θ) : h ∈ H, θ ∈ supp(Θ)}
and equivalence classes Hi ≡ {xT (hi, θ) : θ ∈ supp(Θ)} for all i. Then The-
orem 3 immediately yields that the approximation factor of EC2 is at most
2 ln (1/minh,θ P (h, θ)) + 1, where the minimum is taken over all (h, θ) in the
support of P . In the unit cost case, running EC2 with a modified prior a` la ?,
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allows us to obtain an O(log |H| + log | supp(Θ)|) approximation factor. Note
this model allows us to incorporate complex correlations in the noise terms.
However, a major challenge when dealing with noisy observations is that it is
not always possible to distinguish distinct hypotheses. Even after we have run
all tests, there will generally still be uncertainty about the true hypothesis, i.e.,
the posterior distribution P (H | xT ) obtained using Bayes’ rule may still assign
non-zero probability to more than one hypothesis. If so, uniquely determining
the true hypothesis is not possible. Instead, we imagine that there is a set D
of possible decisions we may make after (adaptively) selecting a set of tests to
perform and we must choose one (e.g., we must decide how to treat the medical
patient, which scientific theory to adopt, or which classifier to use, given our
observations). Thus our goal is to gather data to make effective decisions (?).
Formally, for any decision d ∈ D we take, and each realized hypothesis h, we
incur some loss `(d, h). Decision theory recommends, after observing xA, to
choose the decision d∗ that minimizes the risk, i.e., the expected loss, namely
d∗ ∈ arg mind EH [`(d,H) | xA].
A natural goal in Bayesian active learning is thus to adaptively pick obser-
vations, until we are guaranteed to make the same decision (and thus incur the
same expected loss) that we would have made had we run all tests. Thus, we can
reduce the noisy Bayesian active learning problem to the ECD problem by defin-
ing the equivalence classes over all test outcomes that lead to the same minimum
risk decision. Hence, for each decision d ∈ D, we define
(3.3) Hd ≡ {xT : d = arg min
d′
EH [`(d′, H) | xT ]}.
If multiple decisions minimize the risk for a particular xT , we break ties arbi-
trarily. Identifying the best decision d ∈ D then amounts to identifying which
equivalence class Hd contains the realized vector of outcomes, which is an in-
stance of ECD.
One common approach to this problem is to myopically pick tests maximizing
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the decision-theoretic value of information (VoI) (?): ∆VoI (t |xA) ≡ mind EH [`(d,H) | xA]−
Ext∼Xt|xA [mind EH [`(d,H) | xA, xt]]. The VoI of a test t is the expected reduc-
tion in the expected loss of the best decision due to the observation of xt. How-
ever, we can show there are instances in which such a policy pays Ω(n/ log(n))
times the optimal cost, even under a uniform prior on (h, θ) and with | supp(Θ)| =
2 (Appendix B contains an example). In contrast, on such instances our algorithm
obtains anO(log n) approximation. More generally, we have the following result
for EC2 as an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.
THEOREM 4 Fix hypotheses H, tests T with costs c(t) and outcomes in X ,
decision set D, and loss function `. Fix a prior P (H,Θ) and a function xT :
H×supp(Θ)→ XN which define the probabilistic noise model. Let c(pi) denote
the expected cost of pi incurs to find the best decision, i.e., to identify which
equivalence classHd the outcome vector xT belongs to. Let pi∗ denote the policy
minimizing c(·), and let piEC denote the adaptive policy implemented by EC2.
Then it holds that
c(piEC) ≤
(
2 ln
(
1
p′min
)
+ 1
)
c(pi∗),
where p′min ≡ minh∈H {P (h, θ) : P (h, θ) > 0}.
If all tests have unit cost, by using a modified prior (?) the approximation fac-
tor can be improved toO (log |H|+ log | supp(Θ)|) as in the case of Theorem 3.
3.4. A simple illustration
Intuitively, EC2 chooses the test which (a) distinguishes two hypotheses, con-
nected by an edge, which make different predictions on that test, and (b) has the
largest product of those two hypotheses’ probability. The method is like a sports
tournament in which all pairs of challengers that make different predictions are
created (edges). Pairs are ranked by the product of their probabilities of being the
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FIGURE 1.— A stylized example of Equivalence Class Edge Cutting.
“best” (i.e., most likely). The pair of contending theories with the highest proba-
bility product are then chosen to compete on a conclusive test (which will knock
out one and be consistent with the other; In fact, a challenge question can max-
imize the sum of probability products for multiple edges, hence knocking out
multiple theories at the same time). The idea is to choose the challenge which
knocks out one of two theories –in our context, one of two theories that have the
highest product of likelihoods of being true– as quickly as possible.
Figure 1a shows a graphic illustration of how EC2 works. Each oval repre-
sents an equivalence class (EC) of theory predictions. In the upper left, the theory
predicts choices of [0,0,0] for three tests X1, X2, X3. A “noisy copy” of the the-
ory’s prediction [1∗,0,0] is randomly generated by flipping the first choice from
0 to 1. (No noisy copy is created for the bottom oval theory.) If the noise rate
is 10%, then the probability of observing choices [1∗,0,0] is .10 times the prob-
ability of the true predicted choices [0,0,0]. Edges connect all pairs of predic-
tions between equivalence sets (although, importantly, no edges connect within
an equivalence set since those predictions all stem from noisy copies of the same
true theory). The thickness of the edges is a visual index of the product of the
probabilities of the predictions connected by that edge. The test which can cut
the sum of the thickness of multiple edges is chosen.
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Suppose the test X1 is chosen. It can distinguish the true (noiseless) predic-
tions in left red EC and in lower green EC, which predict 0 in X1, from the upper
right blue EC which predicts 1. If the choice is actually 1, then all theories that
predicted 0 are eliminated and their edges disappear, as shown in Figure 1b.
An important caveat: Note that when implemented, theEC2 algorithm applied
to the ECD will not always choose the true hypothesis. Here’s an example illus-
trating why: Suppose there are 10 binary tests. A hypothesis h1 is a vector of ten
0’s and 1’s. Now suppose we flip those numbers so that all possible vectors are
generated (i.e., there are 10 one-flip noisy copies, 10!/(10-2)!2=45 two-flip noisy
copies, etc.). If we do that for another hypothesis h2, then one of the noisy h1
copies will exactly match one of the h2 copies. We cannot draw an edge between
them, because no test can distinguish them. The approach can’t guarantee that
we will pick the true hypothesis even if we conduct all 10 tests.
Our approach is therefore to flip some small percentage of all true hypothesis
vector elements (5-20%). This approach also can not guarantee perfect accuracy.
The reason is that we might have failed to randomly flip a specific test choice for
a true hypothesis in the way that corresponds to an actual noisy choice a person
made.
The extent to which the wrong hypotheses are selected, averaged across many
simulated designs, will be seen in ground-truth simulations below (Figures 2, 3,
and 4). The asymptotic probability of choosing the correct hypothesis is about
90% for the reasonable noise rates we use. That is, even if all tests are con-
ducted, the fact that noise is injected randomly means we sometimes choose a
wrong hypothesis (if the bit flipping just happened to match choices). This is an
unavoidable price for a realistic noise model such as this one, which allows for
human error to lead to model indistinguishability in some cases.
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Method Theoretical Properties Reference
Information Gain Equivalent to GBS in noise free setting. ?
Value of Information Can only be optimized in restricted settings ?
Generalized Binary Submodular in non-adaptive setting assuming ?
Search (GBS) conditionally independent observations
Random Asymptotic convergence when all tests applied –
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN METHODS THAT ARE COMPARED AGAINST EC2
4. DESIGN AND EVALUATION
The goal is to adaptively select a sequence of tests to present to a subject, in or-
der to distinguish which of the six theories best explains the subject’s responses.
Each choice test t is a pair of lotteries, (Lt1, L
t
2). Based on the theory that repre-
sents behaviour, one of the lotteries would be preferred to the other, denoted by
a binary response xt ∈ {1, 2}. (Stochastic response will be introduced shortly.)
Each lottery consists of three outcomes and their corresponding probabili-
ties, (Lti) = {(x1, p1), (x2, p2), (x3, p3)}. The middle outcome x2 = $5 is fixed
in our experiments. The loss outcome x1 varied between {−20,−10,−5} dol-
lars and the gain outcome x3 varied between {10, 20, 50} dollars. The distri-
bution (p1, p2, p3) over the payoffs was varied, where the probabilities pi ∈
{0.01, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9, 0.99} are chosen such that p1 + p2 + p3 = 1.
To conduct the experiment, we used a display that showed the two lotteries
along with a bar graph (see Appendix A). By considering all non-identical pairs
of such lotteries, we obtained the set of 31626 possible choice test (i.e. question
pairs).
4.1. Ground Truth Analyses
In this section we evaluate the quality of five different design methods, which
are summarized in Table I. Both Information Gain and Generalized Binary
Search are adaptive submodular in the deterministic no-noise setting (where run-
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ning a test long enough is guaranteed to generate the correct response), ?. In the
Random method, a test was picked uniformly at random in each trial from the
set of possible tests without replacement. This should asymptotically converge
to the optimal decision once all tests have been conducted. Value-of-Information
(VoI) criteria is defined w.r.t a decision problem to choose which among several,
potentially expensive, variables to observe in order to most effectively increase
the expected utility (?). Although maximizing VoI non-myopically is optimal, in
all but chain-models (e.g. Markov Chains, and slight generalizations) this non-
myopic optimization is extremely intractable (?), making it infeasible for our
problem.
We evaluated the speed and ability of the five methods to recover the true
model based on a large sample of simulated response sequences. In each se-
quence, a specific true model is assumed, which generates simulated responses
to the sequence of test choices generated by each method. The conclusion the
method draws about which model is likely to have produced the observed re-
sponses is then compared to the true (known) model. This model-recovery exer-
cise is sometimes called “ground truth” analysis. The responses were generated
using a trembling hand function, with a known probability  of making the wrong
choice due to noise.
We chose discrete prior parameter values for different theories based generally
on previous estimates reported in empirical literature, as follows:
◦ The expected value (EV) model has no parameters. ◦ CRRA has one risk-
aversion parameter, ΘCRRA ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0}. ◦ A range of parameter
values for prospect theory has been reported in the literature (e.g., ?, Table 1). For
both PT and CPT we chose ρ ∈ {0.5, 0.62, 0.74, 0.86, 0.98, 1.1}, loss aversion,
λ ∈ {1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3.0}, and Prelec-style probability weighting inflection α ∈
{0.4, 0.52, 0.64, 0.76, 0.88, 1.0}. ◦ The range of parameter values for moments
models MVS and SMVS were not readily available in experimental literature. To
choose an appropriate range of parameter values, we created artificial choice data
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based on prospect theory parameters (from the last paragraph) and found MLE
best-fitting MVS and SMVS parameters.24 The resulting parameter ranges were:
wµ ∈ {0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0}, wσ2 ∈ {0.05, 0.25, 0.45, 0.65, 0.85, 1.05} × 10−2
and wν ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}× 10−4. For SMVS the parameter ranges chosen were:
wµ ∈ {0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0}, wσ ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25, 0.35, 0.45} and wν˜ ∈
{0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4}. We added a slight offset towσ2 andwσ of 0.05 and 0.0005
respectively, to distinguish the model predictions between distinct parameter val-
ues (otherwise several values would make the identical prediction over all de-
signs). Note that this procedure actually limits the ability of the BROAD model
to find questions that sharply distinguish PT and moments models, because the
candidate parameters for the moments models are those which fit PT-generated
choices. However, once more information about likely moments models param-
eters is built up (from our data and others) the entire procedure can be repeated
with a different parameter range that should be even more diagnostic than the
one used here.
For the ground truth analysis, each of the six model classes started with an
equal overall prior belief of 1/6, spread uniformly across all parameter value
configurations in that model class. (For example, each of the 125 specific pa-
rameter configurations for PT was assigned prior 1/6 divided by 125.) In each
ground truth run, a model and parameter configuration was chosen at random.
Thirty test choices were then generated using each of the five methods. In each
such run, we record whether each of the five methods is accurate after each ques-
24For all possible experimental designs (roughly 32,000) in our setup, we generated the re-
sponses for all possible parameter values (125) for the prospect theory model, which generated
about 4 million artificial datapoints. Next, we used a binary search to find a range of good-fitting
parameter values for the moments models. We started with a wide range, and estimated the maxi-
mum likelihood fit of the generated responses. Then we did a binary split, by choosing the half of
the range that contained the MLE. We repeated this procedure until dividing the parameter range
led to a decrease in the likelihood of the responses, i.e. some responses are better explained with
the higher parameter range.
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tion. Accuracy in a run is defined as assigning the highest posterior probability
to the ground-truth model (for the overall model in the same class) in that run.
The procedure was repeated for 1000 runs.
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FIGURE 2.— Performance of the algorithms when probability of error,  =
0.05. The asymptotic bound from running all tests in random order is also shown.
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FIGURE 3.— Performance of the algorithms when probability of error,  =
0.10. The asymptotic bound from running all tests in random order is also shown.
Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the performance of the 5 methods for three error
rates ( = 0.05, 0.10, 0.20).25 We also plot the asymptotic performance upper
25Test-retest switching rates for monetary gamble choices repeated twice are similar to these
error rates, around 15% (e.g. Camerer, J Risk Uncertainty 1989).
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FIGURE 4.— Performance of the algorithms when probability of error,  =
0.20. The asymptotic bound from running all tests in random order is also shown.
bounds from running all the test choices (they are 91.09%, 89.9% and 88.2%
across the three error rates).
The Figures show that VoI and GBS both perform significantly worse than
Random in the presence of noise. These methods are clearly poorly-suited when
responses are noisy, which most experimental social science data are likely to
be. Indeed, the accuracy of the random method degrades as noise increases. EC2
is noticeably more accurate than InfoGain for lower error rates, and comparable
for the highest error rate  = 0.20. It is also evident that most of the improvement
in accuracy occurs in the first 5-20 test choices; and improvement is most rapid
when error is low.
These ground-truth analyses show how frequently the test selection methods
get the right answer. Another performance criterion is how well the experimen-
tal setup and methods distinguish among the models. To investigate this, we plot
the accuracy curves for the individual models from the ground truth process in
Figure 5, for  = 0.05. The experimental setup we use is extremely efficient
(almost 100% accuracy) at classifying SMVS, EV and CRRA. However, clas-
sification accuracy for CPT is weaker and for MVS classification is relatively
poor, although significantly better than chance ( which is 1/6 ≈ 16.7%).
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FIGURE 5.— Performance of the algorithms for individual models when prob-
ability of error,  = 0.05. The asymptotic bounds are also shown for recovering
individual models.
We analyzed the classifications to generate a misclassification matrix in Table
II, i.e. we looked at how the samples from the models are classified by EC2.
Each matrix entry shows the frequency with which a true row model is classified
into each possible column model (Excellent classification would be evidenced
by percentages close to 100% on the diagonal.). As pictured in Figure 5, the
method correctly classifies SMVS, EV and CRRA almost perfectly. The analysis
reveals where the misclassification occurs. One limit is that a significant number
of PT samples (21.5%) are misclassified as CPT, and 40.6% of CPT samples
are misclassified as PT. The other limit is that a large number of MVS samples
(40.3%) are misclassified as EV. This is because the weight on skewness in MVS
can be zero, and when the weight on variance is low enough, the choices of EV
and a low-variance-weight MVS model are difficult to distinguish.
The efficiency of classification can potentially be improved through alternate
experimental setups. Classification quality will also be sensitive to how the pa-
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– PT CPT MVS NMVS EV CRRA
PT 72.7 21.5 2.9 0 2.9 0
CPT 40.6 57.3 1.1 0 0.5 0.5
MVS 0.6 0 52.7 5.8 40.3 0.6
NMVS 0 0.6 1.3 96.2 0.6 1.3
EV 0.5 0 2.6 0.5 96.4 0
CRRA 0 0 0 0 0 100.0
TABLE II
MISCLASSIFICATION MATRIX: PERCENTAGE OF SAMPLES (ROW) THAT ARE CLASSIFIED AS
ANOTHER MODEL (COLUMN) USING EC2 AFTER 50 ROUNDS. THE DIAGONAL REPRESENTS
CORRECT CLASSIFICATION.
rameter ranges are chosen, to how reliably subjects make choices consistent with
one model or another, and other factors. Finally, keep in mind that even with an
efficient setup, the method cannot necessarily achieve perfect classification using
just a small number of test choices.
5. EMPIRICAL DATA AND ANALYSIS
We ran experiments with 57 subjects in 4 separate sessions at UCLA to deter-
mine which models and parameters fit their behaviour best. We used 2 different
treatments using slightly different instructions (shown in Appendix A).26
Thirty test choices were created using EC2. To incentivize the subjects, one
of their choices was selected at random for payment. Subjects were given an
initial endowment of $20 and a $10 show-up fee27. Subjects received payment
based on the lottery they picked in the selected choice, and on a random outcome
from that lottery28. Earnings from choices ranged from $5 to $50, with a mean
26We followed the IRB protocols of UCLA for the conduct of human subject experiments.
27The earnings from the experiment were added to the endowment. Since the minimum out-
come was minus $20, the subjects would never have to pay money, as per IRB requirements.
28A 10×10 matrix of values from 1 to 100 was generated by random permutation, and subjects
were asked to pick a row and column number. The number at the row and column was the random
probability for the subject, which was used to realize the lottery outcome. For example, if the
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of $9.21 and median of $5.
FIGURE 6.— Examples of the dynamically-estimated posterior probability
over all models for two subjects. The subject on the left is rapidly classified
as EV; the one on the right is less rapidly classified as CPT.
The data reveals heterogeneity in the subjects’ estimated types, and the dy-
namics of how type estimation changes over the 30 test choices. We illustrate
two examples in Figure 6. In one example the subject’s type is identified very
early in about 10 rounds. In the second case, the classification is evenly split
between PT and CPT until the final five rounds.
Figure 7 shows stacked plots of the posterior distributions of all 57 subjects
across all six models (averaged over the last five experimental trials). The stacked
plot reveals high confidence in the EV classifications. The posterior mass is typ-
ically spread between the PT and CPT classifications, for those cases in which
either of those models are considered the most likely. The moments models MVS
and SMVS fit fewer subjects, but are typically sharply distinguished from each
other. It is perhaps surprising that CRRA is never the best-fitting model.
Overall classification can be summarized by compressing the data in Figure
7. Figure 8 shows the average posterior distribution of all models after each
round, aggregated over all subjects. It is clear that the posterior distribution of
EV, PT and CPT are generally higher than the moments models and CRRA.
lottery picked was L = {(−5, 0.1), (5, 0.5), (20, 0.4)}, and the random number generated was
67, the subject would earn $20.
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FIGURE 7.— Stacked bar plot of posterior distribution over the 6 models (av-
eraged over the final 5 rounds) for 57 subjects. The subjects are ordered on the x-
axis based on maximum posterior probability into models EV, FPT, CPT, MVS,
SMVS and CRRA .
Furthermore, it appears that separation in model fit both occurs rapidly, in about
five trials, and stabilizes after about 20 trials; after 20 trials the overall ranking
of the model fits does not change at all.
6. IMPLEMENTATION EFFICIENCY AND CHALLENGES
Implementation speeds of BROADs are important because subjects are wait-
ing for dynamic computation after each trial. Therefore a relevant metric of com-
parison is the information gained as function of time (rather than just across the
number of trials). We exploit the adaptive submodular property of EC2 to de-
velop an accelerated greedy implementation that reduces computation time.
The details of the algorithm are in Appendix B. The key insight (illustrated in
figure 14, Appendix B) can be gleaned from the definition of adaptive submod-
ularity: ∆ (t |xB) ≤ ∆ (t |xA), where test t ∈ T for all xA ≺ xB. The value of a
test t can only decrease in future rounds as more observations are made. Initially,
the values of all the tests are calculated and sorted29, and the highest value test
29A Priority Queue is often used to store sorted values for efficient calculation.
ectaart.cls ver. 2006/04/11 file: Econ_EC2.tex date: October 14, 2013
36
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 11
12 12
13 13
14 14
15 15
16 16
17 17
18 18
19 19
20 20
21 21
22 22
23 23
24 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
29 29
0 5 10 15 20 25 300
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Rounds
Po
st 
Pr
ob
.
 
 
CRRANMVSMVS
EV
PTCPT
FIGURE 8.— The posterior distribution of the 6 models after each round. The
aggregate mean and standard error is shown for 57 subjects.
is presented in the first round (and removed from the queue). In subsequent iter-
ations, the value of the most valuable test is recalculated, and only the tests that
had a higher value than this in the previous iteration needs to be recalculated.
This saves an enormous amount of computation, and in practice could lead to
orders of magnitude improvement in efficiency.
In figure 11, we plot the Information gained per unit of time for accelerated
EC2, Information Gain and Random, assuming a response time c (= 28 seconds)
per question. EC2 is more efficient compared to Information Gain and Random.
When the responses are immediate (c = 0), such as when querying a machine
database, Random performs well in a short time assuming no costs for the num-
ber of queries asked. EC2 is superior to InfoGain in both time and accuracy in
this case.
7. MANIPULATION
In BROAD designs, subjects could misrepresent their true preferences in some
choices if the following chain of conditions hold: (i) they believe that future test
choices depend on previous responses; (ii) they can compute how to misrepresent
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FIGURE 9.— The percentage of subjects whose current classification in a
round, corresponds to final classification (in round 30). Subjects trying to ma-
nipulate the algorithm might misrepresent their true type in early rounds.
preferences in early choices to create better future choices (as evaluated by their
own preferences); and (iii) the value of misrepresentation is high enough to be
worthwhile.
We present arguments and evidence that misrepresentation resulting from the
chain of conditions (i)-(iii) is likely to be rare. When misrepresentation does
occur, it could be easily detected and is not likely to lead to wrong conclusions
about revealed preferences which cannot be easily reversed.
We illustrate with a concrete example from our empirical study. For maxi-
mum fidelity, the reader should assume she has true preferences corresponding
to prospect theory (PT), that was the most common type in the data.
The first test choice presented to all subjects is the same (because no choice
history is used to fine-tune the test-choice selection). Subjects are asked to choose
betweenL1 = {(−10, 0.9), (5, 0), (10, 0.1)} andL2 = {(−20, 0.5), (5, 0.49), (50, 0.01)}.
What would a myopic (non-manipulating) agent choose? What would a ma-
nipulating agent choose? In post-experiment polls of this type with subjects peo-
ple are not clear how manipulation would change the answer about what risky
choice to pick. Even if the algorithm is known, solving the decision tree to make
the optimal strategic decision is not easily computable. Here’s an easier version:
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FIGURE 10.— (left) A cartoon of the hypothetical reaction times in the two
treatments to test for manipulation. We expect higher reaction times when sub-
jects are trying to manipulate. (right) The actual reaction times with standard
error bars for the two treatments.
Suppose your preferences are EV. The maximum EV choice is L2. Should you
strategically choose L1 instead?
These examples might shake the readers’ faith that manipulation is easy to
figure out. But more can be said. Next we speculate about whether manipulation
pays, whether it occurs, how it might be detected in experimental results, and
how its effects might be muted or corrected.
◦ Does manipulation pay? To partially answer this question, it is helpful to
establish an upper bound on the maximum gain from manipulation, for a par-
ticular design and player type. The upper bound on the marginal gain is likely
to be low. Here’s why: In later periods, it does not pay to manipulate since do-
ing makes suboptimal immediate choices. And in early periods, manipulation is
immediately costly for the same reason. So there is a natural tradeoff between
the cost of manipulation in a period– the utility losses from deliberately making
the wrong choices– and the future gains from improved choice sets. It could be
that in a 10-period experiment, for example, manipulation is only beneficial in
the first three periods. If so, the posterior probabilities computed after 10 periods
might be close to the correct posteriors because they include 7 periods of non-
manipulation choice data after three periods of misleading data. It is also possible
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FIGURE 11.— (Left) Accuracy as a function of time assuming a response time
of 28 seconds (average response time across all subjects). (Right) Accuracy as a
function of logarithmic time with no response delay.
that when ranking different subjects by their risk-aversion, for example, we can
recover an approximately correct ranking across subjects even if manipulation
leads to biased estimates of their means.
To be more concrete, we computed the upper bound of manipulation for a
clairvoyant agent. Specifically, consider a version of our experimental setup with
10 questions, leading to 210(= 1024) potential sequences of choices. We assume
that the agent knows all the conditional sequences of tests, or tree, that will be
generated by the EC2 algorithm. He chooses the sequence of responses that
maximize his expected earnings over all 10 trials.
We find that the earnings of a clairvoyant agent with EV preferences are only
8% higher than an agent who myopically chooses options that maximize his earn-
ing for each round. More importantly, the resulting type classification is incorrect
in 68 cases, or with 6.6% error rate, which would partly be due to sampling error
(Table II).
◦ Does manipulation actually happen? One way to see whether manipulation
is common is to do an experiment in which one treatment group is told that an
adaptive algorithm is used to generate their future choices, and it may benefit
them to choose risks they do not like to induce the algorithm to offer them bet-
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ter choices in the future. We created two treatments with different instructions.
Subjects were told that the algorithm is adaptive and can theoretically be manip-
ulated (Additional instructions in Appendix A). In post experiment self-reports,
most subjects reported that they did not try to manipulate the system or were
not able to do so. Others said they did make different choices (See online sup-
plementary methods for self-reports). The most striking feature of the result was
that the EC2 algorithm identified more subjects in the “informed” as using ex-
pected value maximization. Some subjects said that knowing an algorithm was
changing their choices led them to maximize EV. It is also notable that the sub-
jects in the “informed” condition did not have higher average earnings (as might
be expected if they are manipulating). This is explained in more detail below.
◦ Can manipulation be detected? Strategizing will typically leave clear finger-
prints in the data from choices across a sequence of questions. First, in typical
cases the posterior probability of the most likely model (as judged from final
round result) goes up across the trials. In contrast, a manipulating respondent
will appear to be one “type” in early trials, and then revert to their true “type”
in later trials (as the future benefit of manipulation shrinks). This will leave a
telltale pattern of posterior probabilities veering from one type to another, from
earlier to later trials. We explored how diagnostic this pattern is for simulated
agents who optimally misrepresent, and in actual experimental data, in figure 9.
When artificial subjects are known to be manipulating, the percentage of subject
classifications corresponding to the true type (as judged from final-round poste-
riors) is very low in early rounds. However, the opposite pattern is evident in the
actual choice data.
Furthermore, if manipulation in early choices is cognitively demanding, ma-
nipulating subjects will initially have high reaction times that decrease sharply
over time, as they begin to express easily-computed true preferences in alter tri-
als. However, reaction times from actual experimental data are similar in the
control and cued-manipulation treatment, see Figure 10.
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◦ How can manipulation be limited? There are two sensible ideas about how
manipulation could be limited. (Unfortunately, both of them weaken the incen-
tives to respond truthfully to all questions that are asked.) The first remedy30 is
to create a space of questions Q, then sample from Q using a BROAD proce-
dure. Subjects are told that one question will be chosen for payment from the
entire set Q, not from the subset that were actually selected and answered. Mis-
representing preference in the first few questions in the BROAD procedure does
lead to “better” questions being included later in the BROAD set, but it does not
change at all the chance that those questions will be chosen for payment (since
BROAD-selected and all other questions in Q are equally likely).
A second remedy is to make the probability with which questions are chosen
for payment much higher for the earlier questions in the sequence (where the
incentive for mispresentation is highest). We will investigate numerically how
much “front-loading” probability onto early questions mutes the incentive to
misrepresent.
To tackle this, we ran 2 sessions, with 30 subjects at UCLA, with augmented
instructions (Appendix A). Subjects were informed that an adaptive algorithm
was being used, and that prior choices will affect subsequent options.
By definition, subjects would manipulate the algorithm in order to increase
their earnings. The average earnings in the prior session was 9.44 dollars, with a
standard deviation of 9.40, and the average earnings with the augmented instruc-
tions was 9.00 dollars with a standard deviation of 9.3. Thus the earnings from
both sessions were nearly identical.
In Figure 12 we show the classifications for the two different cases to test for
effects of manipulability (see Section 7 below). We cannot reject the hypothe-
sis that the two distributions of classifications are statistically different using a
2-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. We show stacked plots of the posterior distri-
bution of the two treatments in figure 13.
30This idea was suggested by Cathleen Johnson, but never published.
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Furthermore, we obtained self-reports from subjects (the questions are shown
in Appendix A), to find out if the participants used any strategies to game the sys-
tem. The majority of the participants did not try to manipulate the algorithm. The
few subjects who reported attempts to manipulate the algorithm did not come up
with any effective method (summarized self-reports to be made available online).
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FIGURE 12.— The classifications for the two treatments to test for manipula-
bility. Treatment 1 has 27 subjects, and treatment 2 has 30 subjects. The differ-
ence between the two distributions was not found to be statistically significant.
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FIGURE 13.— Stacked bar plot of posterior distribution over the 6 models (av-
eraged over the final 5 rounds) for 27 subjects in the non-manipulation condition
(left) and the manipulation condition (right).
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This paper proposes and implements a new BROAD method for adaptively se-
lecting which choice pairs to present to identify a distribution of economic pref-
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erence parameters (and associated theories) from a known prior distribution. The
novel approach here uses Equivalence Class Determination as a way to to make
inferences about noisy choice theories using methods developed for a classic,
noiseless case. The trick is intuitively simple: A noiseless deterministic theory
will make a single 0-1 choice in each choice pair. A small amount of noise is
tolerated by “flipping” those 0-1 bits in a vector of choices and creating noise-
injected “copies” of a target theory. Then the algorithm only tries to distinguish
between an equivalence class (the target theory and all its noisy copies) and other
equivalence classes.
We introduced an adaptive greedy (myopic) algorithm EC2, to choose ques-
tions from a design space. The algorithm measures edge strength by the product
of the probabilities of two theories with similar predictions, then chooses a test
which will “cut” the strongest edge (by ruling out one theory in the edge-pair
and letting the other survive). The edge-cutting objective function is adaptive
submodular, which leads to nice theoretical properties.
We applied EC2 to an experimental design problem choosing among six dif-
ferent theories of risky choice (expectational theories, such as EU and prospect
theory, and moment-weighting theories). Ground-truth simulations, which eval-
uate how well the algorithm approximates behavior that is known (from simula-
tion) shows that EC2 chooses the right theories rapidly (within 5-20 trials), and
more rapidly than other theories for modest error rates.
In our empirical application, the method indicates that most subjects choosing
among monetary gambles are classified (with high posterior probability) as using
prospect theory evaluation, or EV.
As economists, we are also naturally concerned that if subjects understand that
the algorithm is adaptive, there is a strategic incentive to misreport preferences
in early trials to create better choices in latter trials. However, we argue that
computing the value of misrepresentation is difficult; The value is small even
when it can be computed (e.g., 8% increase in earnings), and misrepresentation
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is likely to leave telltale signs in a time series of choices (high early response
times and switching of posterior modes partway through the experiment) which
we simply do not see in data. As a last check, in one experimental treatment we
explained that the method of selecting choice questions was adaptive and that,
in theory, the subjects could earn more if they exploited this property. Subjects
in that treatment did not behave significantly differently and did not earn more
money.
The major future direction for research is to implement these algorithms to
efficiently sort through theories in many areas of empirical economics, where
multiple theories have coexisted for a long time.
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APPENDIX A: DETAILS OF THE EXPERIMENT
User Interface
	   	  TABLE III
The User Interface presented to the participants. The two amounts and probabilities for the 2
lotteries are shown in text on the right. The same information is displayed as a graph on the left.
Instructions
This is an experiment on the economics of decision making. If you follow
the instructions and make good decisions you can earn a considerable amount
of money which will be paid to you in cash. The funds have been supplied by a
foundation that supports this research.
The experiment has 60 rounds. At the beginning you will begin with an en-
dowment of $20. In each round you will choose between one of two lotteries.
Each lottery has 3 possible outcomes:
(i) One negative (loss) outcome of -$5, -$10 or -$20. (If you lose this amount
it will be subtracted from your initial $20 endowment and you will be paid
the remainder.)
(ii) One positive (gain) outcome of $5.
(iii) One positive (gain) outcome of $10, $20 or $50.
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Each of the three possible outcomes has an associated probability of occurring.
You will see a textbox with the two lottery choices described in text, on the right
side of the screen. On the left side of the screen, you will see the same informa-
tion displayed as a histogram. The height of each line represents the probability
of that outcome occurring. The $5 outcome is always shown in green, the higher
positive outcome in blue, and the negative outcome in red.
For example, you might see the following screen:
	   	  
In Lottery 1, you can lose $5 with probability 0.1, gain $5 with probability 0.4
or gain $10 with probability 0.5.
In Lottery 2, you can lose $20 with probability 0.01, gain $5 with probability
0.74 or gain $10 with probability 0.25.
You must close the graph display by clicking on the X (close) button. Then
you can enter your choice into the textbox by pressing 1 or 2.
There is no time limit for viewing the graph and entering your choice. After
you enter your choice, the screen will say REST. Another choice between two
lottery options will be displayed after a couple of seconds.
After finishing all 60 rounds, we will randomly pick one of the 60 pairs of lot-
teries you were asked about to determine your additional earnings. Each lottery
pair is equally likely to be chosen so you should treat each one as if it could be
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the paid round.
To determine which of the three outcomes you receive a random integer num-
ber between 1 and 100 will determine the outcome you get. Each of those integers
will be equally likely (using a procedure described next).
To use the example above, suppose you chose Lottery 1. In that lottery, the
outcome -$5 has 10% probability. Therefore, if the random number chosen is
1-10 then the outcome will be -$5. Notice that the range 1-10 is 10% of all the
numbers from 1 to 100. So the percentage of possible numbers that would give
the outcome -$5 corresponds to the probability .10.
In the lottery 1 example, the outcome will be +$5 with probability .4, and +$10
with probability .5. To implement these probabilities fairly, numbers from 11 to
50 will lead to the outcome +$5 and numbers from 51-100 will lead to the out-
come +$10. Those two ranges of numbers are 40% and 50% of all the numbers
1-100, so the percentage of possible numbers corresponds to the probabilities
stated in the text and shown on the graph.
Additional Instructions for Manipulability Check
These additional instructions appended to the original instructions for Manip-
ulability Check condition:
It could help you to know that an adaptive algorithm generates the choices
between two lotteries that are presented to you, in the first 30 lottery choices.
That is, your previous choices determine the following questions that are
presented to you, because the algorithm is trying to determine the kinds of
risks you like to take and the kinds of risks you do not like to take. It is
possible, mathematically, to choose lotteries you do not like in the beginning
in order to lead the adaptive algorithm to create future lottery choices that
you like better. If you think you can guide the algorithm in this way, by
choosing lotteries you dont like to create bettery choice pairs in future trials,
you are free to do so. However, your final payoff will be calculated from one
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of the questions selected at random.
Quiz before the Experiment
1. There is always a possible $5 outcome for every lottery (circle one)
TRUE FALSE
2. The red lines in the graph show the larger amounts that could be won ($10,
$20, $50) (circle one)
TRUE FALSE
3. If the row I choose has a random number which leads to a loss -$20 for the
lottery that I chose, I still get to keep the $20 endowment. (circle one)
TRUE FALSE
Self-Report after Experiment
1. Did you think that the questions in the first part were generated by an
adaptive algorithm (circle one)
YES NO
2. Have you figured out how the adaptive algorithm chose the subsequent
questions based on your responses? If so, can you state the strategy you
used to game it?
3. What strategy did you use to maximize your potential earnings in the first
round? Please write a few sentences.
4. How was your strategy in the first part different from your strategy in the
second part? Please write a few sentences.
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FIGURE 14.— Sorted values of tests for the accelerated EC2 implementation.
APPENDIX B
Details of the Efficient Implementation
Figure 14 illustrates the efficient accelerated implementation of EC2 using
a Priority Queue. Initially, the the tests are sorted according to their value, and
the first test (number 1) is selected in the first round (and removed from the
queue). In the second iterations, the value of the most valuable test (number 2) is
recalculated, and only the tests that had a higher value than this in the previous
iteration needs to be recalculated (number 3 and 4). The other tests (from 5)
cannot have a higher value in round 2 than test number 2, and can be ignored.
Algorithm 1 outlines the general procedure.
The methods were coded in Java SE 6.0. On a 2.53 GHz Intel computer with
4GB memory, the Information Gain criteria has to evaluate all 31,626 tests and
takes 20.1 seconds to generate each question. The accelerated EC2 method eval-
uates between 1 and up to 12 thousand tests at each iteration. By pre-computing
all the values and efficient caching, the accelerated EC2 method takes between
0.02 seconds to 6.1 seconds to generate a question. The average time is 0.4 sec-
onds (over 1000 simulation runs of 100 rounds each).
Additional Proofs
LEMMA 5 The objective function f of Eq. (3.2) is strongly adaptive monotone.
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Input: Set of hypothesesH; Set of tests T ; prior distribution P ; function f .
begin
A ← ∅; Ψ← ∅; PriorityQueue Q← EmptyQueue
foreach t ∈ T do
Q.insert(t,+∞)
while ∃h 6= h′ : P (h | xA) > 0 and P (h′ | xA) > 0 do
δmax ← −∞; tmax ← NULL;
while δmax < Q.maxPriority() do
t← Q.pop();
δ ← ∆(t|Ψ);
Q.insert(t, δ);
if δmax < δ then
δmax ← δ; tmax ← t;
Set A ← A∪ {tmax}; Q.remove(tmax);
Observe outcome xtmax ; Set Ψ← Ψ ∪ {(tmax, xtmax)}
end
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for accelerated EC2. Q.insert(t, δ) inserts t with
priority δ, Q.pop() removes and returns the item with greatest priority,
Q.maxPriority() returns the maximum priority of the elements in Q, and
Q.remove(t) deletes t from Q.
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PROOF: We must show that for all xA, t /∈ A and possible answer x for test t
that
(8.1) EH [f(A, H) | xA] ≤ EH [f(A ∪ {t} , H) | xA, Xt = x]
Towards this end, it is useful to notice that for all t ∈ T the function h 7→
Et (h) depends only on Xt. Hence for any xA, the function h 7→ f(A, h) is
constant over realizations xT  xA, so we can define a function g(xA) such that
g(xA) = EH [f(A, H) | xA] by g(xA) := w
(⋃
t∈A Et (xt)
)
where xA = (xt)t∈A
and Et (x) is the set of edges cut by t ifXt = x. Note that for all xA ≺ xB we have
g(xA) ≤ g(xB), since the edge weights are nonnegative. Setting B = A ∪ {t}
yields Eq. (8.1) and hence implies strong adaptive monotonicity. Q.E.D.
LEMMA 6 The objective function f of Eq. (3.2) is adaptive submodular for any
prior with rational values.
PROOF: We first prove the result assuming a uniform prior P (·), and then
show how to reduce the general prior case to the uniform prior case. Hence
all edges have weight 1/n2, where there are n hypotheses. For convenience,
we also rescale our units of reward so that all edges have unit weight. (Note
that f is adaptive submodular iff cf is for any constant c > 0.) To prove adap-
tive submodularity, we must show that for all xA ≺ xB and t ∈ T , we have
∆ (t |xB) ≤ ∆ (t |xA). Fix t and xA, and let V(xA) := {h : P (h | xA) > 0} de-
note the version space, if xA encodes the observed outcomes. Let nV := |V(xA)|
be the number of hypotheses in the version space. Likewise, let ni,a(xA) :=
| {h : h ∈ V(xA, Xt = a) ∩Hi} |, and let na(xA) :=
∑m
i=1 ni,a(xA). Also, de-
fine ea(xA) := 12
∑
i 6=j
∑
b 6=a ni,b(xA) · nj,b(xA) to be the number of edges cut
such that at t both hypotheses agree with each other but disagree with the realized
hypothesis h∗, conditioning onXt = a. We define a function θ of these quantities
such that ∆ (t |xA) = θ(n(xA), e(xA)), where n(xA) is the vector consisting of
ni,a(xA) for all i and a and e(xA) is the vector consisting of ea(xA) for all a.
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For brevity, we suppress the dependence of xA where it is unambiguous. Then,
as we will explain below, θ is defined as
(8.2) θ(n, e) :=
1
2
∑
i 6=j
∑
a6=b
ni,a · nj,b +
∑
a
ea
(
1− na
nV
)
Here, i and j range over all class indices, and a and b range over all possible
outcomes of test t. The first term on the right-hand side counts the number of
edges that will be cut by selecting test t no matter what the outcome of t is.
Such edges consist of hypotheses that disagree with each other at t and, as with
all edges, lie in different classes. The second term counts the expected number
of edges cut by t consisting of hypotheses that agree with each other at t. Such
edges will be cut by t iff they disagree with the true hypothesis h∗ at t. The edges
{h, h′} with h, h′ ∈ V(xA) and P (Xt = a | h) = P (Xt = a | h′) = 1 (of
which there are ea) will be cut by t iff Xt 6= a. Since we assume a uniform prior,
P [Xt 6= a | xA] = 1 − na/nV for any partial realization xA with t /∈ A, hence
the expected contribution of these edges to ∆ (t |xA) is ea (1− na/nV), from
whence we get the second term.
Now fix xB  xA. Our strategy for proving ∆ (t |xB) ≤ ∆ (t |xA) is as fol-
lows. As more observations are made, the version space can only shrink, i.e.
V(xB) ⊆ V(xA). This means that for all i and a, ni,a is nonincreasing, i.e.,
ni,a(xB) ≤ ni,a(xA). Note we may interpret ea as a function of the variables in
{ni,a : 1 ≤ i ≤ m, a ∈ X}, and that it is nondecreasing in each ni,a, so we may
also deduce that ea(xB) ≤ ea(xA) for all a. Hence we consider a parameterized
path p(τ) in R(m+1)·` from p(0) := (n(xB), e(xB)) to p(1) := (n(xA), e(xA)).
Then by integrating along the path we obtain
(8.3) ∆ (t |xA)−∆ (t |xB) =
∫ 1
τ=0
(
d(θ◦p)
dτ
)
dτ .
We require that at each point in p it holds that ea = 12
∑
i 6=j
∑
b 6=a ni,b · nj,b for
all a, and also ensure that p is nondecreasing in each coordinate. There exists a
path meeting these requirements, since (n(xB), e(xB)) ≤ (n(xA), e(xA)) and
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each ea is nondecreasing in each ni,b variable. This implies ∂ni,a/∂τ ≥ 0 and
∂ea/∂τ ≥ 0 for all i and a. Hence we can prove the integral is nonnegative by
applying the chain rule for the derivative to obtain
d(θ◦p)
dτ
=
∑
i,a
∂θ
∂ni,a
∂ni,a
∂τ
+
∑
a
∂θ
∂ea
∂ea
∂τ
and then proving that ∂θ/∂ni,a ≥ 0 and ∂θ/∂ea ≥ 0 for all i and a. Next, observe
that ∂θ/∂ea = (1− na/nV) ≥ 0. So fix a class index k and an outcome c and
consider ∂θ/∂nk,c. Elementary calculus tells us that
(8.4)
∂θ
∂nk,c
=
∑
j 6=k, b6=c
nj,b +
∑
b
ebnb
n2V
− ec
nV
This quantity is nonnegative iff
(8.5) nVec ≤ n2V ·
∑
j 6=k, b6=c
nj,b +
∑
b
ebnb
Now substitute 1
2
∑
i 6=j
∑
b6=c ni,b · nj,b for ec to obtain
(8.6)
nVec =
nV
2
∑
i 6=j
∑
b 6=c
ni,b·nj,b ≤ nV ·
( ∑
j 6=k, b6=c
nj,b
)(∑
i,a
ni,a
)
≤ n2V ·
( ∑
j 6=k, b6=c
nj,b
)
Since
∑
b ebnb ≥ 0, we obtain Eq. (8.5) from Eq. (8.6) by inspection, and hence
∂θ/∂nk,c ≥ 0 for all k and c. This completes the proof of the adaptive submod-
ularity of f under a uniform prior.
We now show how to reduce the general prior case to the uniform prior case.
Fix any prior P with rational probabilities, i.e. P (h) ∈ Q for all h. Then there
exists d ∈ N and function k : H → N such that such that P (h) = k(h)/d.
Create a new instance containing d hypotheses, where for each h ∈ H there are
k(h) copies of h, denoted by h1, . . . , hk(h). Each copy of h induces the same
conditional distribution of test outcomes P (X1, . . . , XN | h). All copies of h
belong to the same class, and copies of h and h′ belong to the same class iff h
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and h′ do. Finally, assign a uniform prior to this new instance. Then the adaptive
submodularity of f on this new instance implies the adaptive submodularity on
the original instance, if the weight of edge {h, h′} in the original instance is
proportional to the number of edges between the copies of h and the copies of h′
in the new instance. That is, it suffices to set w({h, h′}) ∝ k(h) · k(h′), and our
choice of weight function, w({h, h′}) := P (h) · P (h′), satisfies this condition.
Q.E.D.
A Bad Example for Information Gain
A popular heuristic for the Optimal Decision Tree problem are to adaptively
greedily select the test that maximizes the information gain in the distribution
over hypotheses, conditioned on all previous test outcomes. The same heuristic
can be applied to the Equivalence Class Determination problem, in which we
compute the information gain with respect to the entropy of the distribution over
classes rather than hypotheses. Let piIG denote the resulting policy for Equiva-
lence Class Determination.
Another common heuristic for Optimal Decision Tree is to adaptively greedily
select the test maximizing the Bayesian decision-theoretic value of information
(VoI) criterion. Recall the value of information of a test t is the expected reduc-
tion in the expected risk of the minimum risk decision, where the risk is the ex-
pected loss. Formally, consider the Bayesian decision-theoretic setup described
in §3.3. The VoI criterion myopically selects test to maximize
∆VoI (t |xA) := min
d
EH [`(d,H) | xA]− Ext∼Xt|xA
[
min
d
EH [`(d,H) | xA, xt]
]
.
This heuristic can be also be applied to the Equivalence Class Determination
problem, by taking the decision setD to be the set of equivalence classes, and the
loss function to be the 0–1 classification loss function, i.e., `(d,H) = 1[H /∈ d].
Let piVoI denote the resulting policy.
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In this section we present a family of Equivalence Class Determination in-
stances for which both piIG and piVoI perform significantly worse than the optimal
policy.
THEOREM 7 There exists a family of Equivalence Class Determination in-
stances with uniform priors such that c(piIG) = Ω (n/ log(n)) c(pi∗) and c(piVoI) =
Ω (n/ log(n)) c(pi∗), where n is the number of hypotheses and pi∗ is an optimal
policy.
In fact, we will prove a lower bound for each policy within a large family of
adaptive greedy policies which contains piIG and piVoI, which we call posterior–
based. Informally, this family consists of all greedily policies that use only infor-
mation about the posterior equivalence class distribution to select the next test.
More precisely, these policies define a potential function Φ which maps distri-
butions of distributions over equivalence classes to real numbers, and at each
time step select the test t which maximizes Φ of the posterior distribution (over
test outcomes xt) of the posterior distribution over equivalence classes generated
by adding xt to the previously seen test outcomes. In the event of a tie, we se-
lect any test maximizing this quantity at random. The information gain policy
is posterior–based; Φ is simply −1 times the expected entropy of the posterior
equivalence-class distribution. Likewise, the value of information policy is also
posterior–based; Φ is simply−1 times the expected loss of the best action for the
posterior equivalence-class distribution. Hence to prove Theorem 7 it suffices to
prove the following more general theorem.
THEOREM 8 There exists a family of Equivalence Class Determination in-
stances with uniform priors such that c(pi) = Ω (n/ log(n)) c(pi∗) for any posterior–
based policy pi, where n is the number of hypotheses and pi∗ is an optimal policy.
PROOF: Fix integer parameter q ≥ 1. There are m = 2q classes Ha for each
1 ≤ a ≤ 2q. EachHa consists of two hypotheses, ha,0 and ha,1. We call a the in-
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dex ofHa. The prior is uniform over the hypothesesH = {ha,v : 1 ≤ a ≤ m, 0 ≤ v ≤ 1}.
There are four types of tests, all with binary outcomes and all of unit cost. There
is only one test of the first type, t0, which tells us the value of v in the real-
ized hypothesis h∗a,v. Hence for all a, H = ha,v ⇒ Xt0 = v. Tests of the
second type are designed to help us quickly discover the index of the realized
class via binary search if we have already run t0, but to offer no information
gain whatsoever if t0 has not yet been run. There is one such test tk for all t
with 1 ≤ k ≤ q. For z ∈ N, let φk (z) denote the kth least-significant bit of
the binary encoding of z, so that z =
∑∞
k=1 2
k−1φk (z). Then for each ha,v we
have H = ha,v ⇒ Xtk = 1[φk (a) = v]. Tests of the third type are designed
to allow us to do a (comparatively slow) sequential search on the index of the
realized class. Specifically, we have tests tseqk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m, such that
H = ha,v ⇒ Xtseqk = 1[a = k]. Finally, tests of the fourth type,
{
tdumbk : k ∈ N
}
,
are dummy tests that reveal no information at all. Formally, Xtdumbk always equals
zero.
Given this input, suppose H = ha,v. One solution is to run t0 to find v, then
run tests t1, . . . , tq to determine φk (a) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ q and hence to determine
a. This reveals the value of H , and hence the class H belongs to. Since the tests
have unit cost, this policy pi′ has cost c(pi′) = q + 1.
Next, fix a posterior–based policy pi and consider what it will do. Call a class
possible if not all of its hypotheses have been ruled out by tests performed so far.
Note that all possible classes contain the same number of hypotheses, because
they initially have two, and each test tk that can reduce the size of a possible class
to one, will reduce the size of every possible class to one. This, and the fact that
the prior is uniform, implies that the posterior equivalence-class distribution is
uniform over the remaining possible classes. If no tests in {tk : 0 ≤ k ≤ q} have
been run, as is initially the case, any single test in this set will not change the
posterior equivalence-class distribution. Hence, as measured with respect to Φ,
such tests are precisely as good as the dummy tests. If these tests are each better
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than any test in {tseqk : 1 ≤ k ≤ m}, then pi selects among {tk : 0 ≤ k ≤ q} ∪{
tdumbk : k ∈ N
}
at random. Since there are infinitely many dummy tests, with
probability one a dummy test is selected. Since the posterior remains the same,
pi will repeatedly select a test at random from this set, resulting in an infinite
loop as dummy tests are selected repeatedly ad infinitum. Otherwise, some test
tseqk is preferable to the other tests, measured with respect to Φ. In the likely event
that t is not the index of H , we are left with a residual problem in which tests in
{tk : 0 ≤ k ≤ q} still have no effect on the posterior, there is one less class, and
the prior is again uniform. Hence our previous argument still applies, and pi will
either enter an infinite loop or will repeatedly select tests in {tseqk : 1 ≤ k ≤ m}
until a test has an outcome of 1. Thus in expectation pi costs at least c(pi) ≥
1
m
∑m
z=1 z = (m + 1)/2. Since m = 2
q, n = 2m, and c(pi∗) ≤ c(pi′) = q + 1 =
log2(n) we infer
c(pi) ≥ m
2
=
(
n
4 log2(n)
)
c(pi∗)
which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
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